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Introduction
The Japanese-American internment litigation1 demonstrated the
difficulty of holding the government accountable for overreaching in national security cases. While some have argued that post-9/11 decisions
break with that trend,2 the Supreme Court has severely limited suits

†

Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. I thank Bob
Chang for comments on a previous draft.

1.

Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Eric L. Muller, American
Inquisition: The Hunt for Japanese American Disloyalty in World
War II 116–21 (2007) (discussing government stereotypes in wartime
determinations of Japanese-Americans’ loyalty); Peter Irons, Justice at
War (1983) (discussing the course of litigation and strategies of key lawyers
in cases).

2.

See generally Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National
Security, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1123 (2014).
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for damages against senior officials.3 In Ziglar v. Abbasi,4 the Supreme
Court erected virtually impassable barriers to such actions, in a case
brought by post-9/11 immigration detainees whom senior officials had
shifted to a high-security facility in the absence of any proof of terrorist
ties.5 As a result, the detainees had allegedly been subjected to unduly
long periods of detention and serious physical abuse.6 This Article argues that the Court’s parsimonious approach to damage suits against
senior officials will hinder habits of deliberation that the Framers prized
and impede learning the lessons of the internment.
The constitutional tort remedies that the Supreme Court hobbled
in Abbasi stem from a Warren Court precedent, Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,7 in which the Court held
that the Constitution itself directly implied the existence of a cause of
action for damages against federal officials.8 Bivens was the contemporary manifestation of two lines of precedent that pre-dated the Constitution’s enactment. English cases well-known to the Framers allowed
suits for damages against officials by individuals harmed by abusive
government searches.9 During the Founding Era, individuals obtained
monetary compensation against officials in prize cases.10 In addition,
the Framers drafted Article III of the Constitution specifically to
3.

See generally Carlos M. Vazquez & Steven I. Vladeck, State Law, the
Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev.
509 (2013) (broadly criticizing development of limits on Bivens suits);
Jonathan Hafetz, Reconceptualizing Federal Courts in the War on Terror,
56 St. Louis L.J. 1055, 1075–86 (2012) (criticizing curbs on monetary
remedies in national security cases); Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in
Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law,
96 Iowa L. Rev. 195 (2010) (critiquing judicial limits on Bivens remedies
in national security cases and suggesting alternative approaches). But see
Kent, supra note 2, at 1147–54 (arguing that sound doctrinal and pragmatic
reasons explain evolution of limits on Bivens litigation).

4.

137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).

5.

The Supreme Court first limited detainees’ relief in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 556
U.S. 662, 665 (2009) (holding that allegations of discriminatory intent in
initial investigation of detainees were implausible and that senior officials did
not have supervisory liability for abuses); see also James E. Pfander,
Constitutional Torts and the War on Terror 42–44 (2017)
(critiquing Iqbal’s premises and analysis); Shirin Sinnar, The Lost Story of
Iqbal, 105 Geo. L.J. 379 (2017) (discussing the human story behind the
case).

6.

Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1852–53.

7.

403 U.S. 388 (1971).

8.

Id. at 395–97.

9.

See Pfander, supra note 5, at 6–14.

10.

Id.
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provide the newly created federal courts with jurisdiction over suits for
damages and other relief brought by foreign nationals.11 Admittedly, the
Framers viewed federal jurisdiction over such actions as a corrective
measure for the biases of state courts.12 Nevertheless, the concerns of
the Framers—particularly Alexander Hamilton—support a broader
reading: remedies are apt whenever precipitous action by government
officials stokes the “spirit of injustice” at the state or federal level. 13
Writing for the Court in Abbasi, Justice Kennedy failed to acknowledge either precedential strand. Justice Kennedy’s opinion limited
Bivens claims to three areas carved out in the decade after Bivens:
searches by federal agents in criminal investigations, prison conditions,
and employment discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.14 In “new” contexts that moved beyond these confines, Justice
Kennedy opined that the “factors counselling hesitation” alluded to by
the Bivens Court precluded access to remedies for constitutional torts.15
According to Justice Kennedy, suits for damages could unduly chill
officials’ sense of initiative16 and usurp a function that Kennedy asserted
belonged to Congress: balancing the deterrence of constitutional violations against the preservation of officials’ discretion in coping with
evolving national security threats.17
To shift to an anti-remedy default stance, Justice Kennedy had to
ignore the Founding Era pedigree of suits for damages against public
officials and the constitutional role of suits by foreign nationals. Justice
Kennedy’s opinion also failed to acknowledge Hamilton’s praise of
judicial review as a check against the haste, myopia, and prejudice of
the political branches—praise that also applies to Bivens actions. This
Article seeks to recover that understanding to counter the deference the
Court displayed in Abbasi.
The Article is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the history
of suits for damages against U.S. officials as well as the constitutional
importance of federal jurisdiction over actions by foreign nationals. This
history, supported by Hamilton’s vision of judicial review, installed a
pro-remedy presumption regarding actions for monetary relief against
11.

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.

12.

The Federalist No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).

13.

Id. (discussing the rationale for judicial review).

14.

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854–55 (2017).

15.

Id. at 1857 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)).

16.

Id. at 1868.

17.

Id. at 1862 (cautioning against judicial crafting of remedy such as suit for
damages absent “affirmative action by Congress”).
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public officials. Part II outlines the Abbasi Court’s rationale for shifting
from a pro-remedy presumption to an anti-remedy default that brought
a “full stop” to Bivens actions development. Part III critiques the
Abbasi Court’s pivot as unduly discounting history and Hamilton’s
vision.

I. History and Founding Era
Suits for damages against public officials are not a new development
in American law.18 Their pedigree stretches back to England in the era
before the Revolutionary War. From that beginning, the history of suits
for damages or other monetary compensation against officials extends
to state and federal systems from the Founding Era to the Civil War
and beyond. That history overlaps within an equally prominent commitment at the time of the Constitution’s enactment to conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear suits for damages and other relief
brought by aggrieved foreign nationals.19
In England, courts before the Revolution had clearly established
the right of individuals to sue officials for unreasonable searches and
seizures.20 In groundbreaking English cases, courts awarded damages for
abuses committed by officials engaged in searches and seizures, including searches authorized by uncabined general warrants that allowed
officials to search homes for evidence of political opposition to the government. The Framers were aware of these prominent English cases,
which formed part of the backdrop for enactment of the Fourth Amendment.21 The latter provision’s protection of “the people” against “unreasonable searches and seizures”22 borrowed in part from the English
cases upholding suits for damages against errant or abusive government
officials. Indeed, a key reason for seeking a specific warrant to search a
home or other property for evidence of crime was the utility of such a
warrant as a defense against a subsequent suit for damages brought by
the owner of the property.23

18.

See Pfander, supra note 5, at 6–14.

19.

Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths About the Alien
Tort Statute, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1609, 1623–24 (2014).

20.

See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886); Sina Kian, The Path
of Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How It Changed, and
How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 132, 145–46 (2012).

21.

William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105
Yale L.J. 393, 402–03 (1995).

22.

U.S. Const. amend IV.

23.

Stuntz, supra note 21, at 410.
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Payment of monetary compensation was also well-known during
the U.S. Founding Era. In prize cases, for example, courts regularly
required that captains who had wrongfully seized vessels provide compensation to the vessel’s rightful owner. This practice occurred in two
celebrated cases. In Little v. Barreme,24 Chief Justice John Marshall, in
his opinion for the Court, overcame his initial hesitation in requiring
that a U.S. navy captain pay compensation to the owner of a ship seized
in violation of a federal statute.25 In Murray v. The Schooner Charming
Betsy,26 the Court ordered a U.S. navy commander to pay for seizing a
vessel owned by a foreign national not subject to provisions of U.S. neutrality law that limited trade with France.27
During this time, officials under an obligation to provide such
compensation regularly received indemnification from Congress.28
Indemnification, which often occurs today along with funding for legal
representation, held the official harmless for any adverse award.
Officials’ knowledge that indemnification would be forthcoming mitigated any chilling effect wrought by the prospect of liability on officials’
discharge of public duties. Congress typically opted for this regime of
judicial redress and subsequent indemnification as a superior alternative
to immunity from suit, which Congress doled out sparingly.29
Other early cases tell the same tale. For example, in one case a
court authorized the award of monetary damages against a collector of
an illegal fine who had entered the defendant’s home and seized property to pay a fine.30 State courts regularly considered suits for damages
against both state and federal officials.31 Through the Civil War, individuals sued officials alleging torts both constitutional and common-law

24.

6 U.S. 170 (1804).

25.

Id. at 179; cf. Pfander, supra note 5, at 6–9 (discussing Marshall’s opinion).

26.

6 U.S. 64 (1804).

27.

Id. at 125.

28.

Pfander, supra note 5, at 9–11.

29.

Id. at 11; Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 3, at 531–42.

30.

Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806).

31.

Vasquez & Vladeck, supra note 3, at 570–71.
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in nature.32 Congress enacted legislation intended to provide officials
with protection from liability.33
In sum, in English courts and U.S. courts from the Founding Era
through the aftermath of the Civil War, the courts’ default position favored the availability of suits for damages against public officials.
Specific legislation from Congress could either immunize or indemnify
those officials. However, absent such express congressional action,
courts would routinely entertain lawsuits against official defendants.34
32.

These suits usually sought redress for detention associated with that conflict.
Plaintiffs typically alleged that the detentions were unlawful and a violation
of the Suspension Clause, which courts have read to guarantee access to
habeas corpus to persons within the United States not charged with a crime,
who are also not belligerents in the armed conflict prompting the detention.
See Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107
Colum. L. Rev. 1533, 1560–62 (2007); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an
Emergency Power, 118 Yale L.J. 600, 651–55 (2009); see also Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31–33 (1942) (discussing Civil War precedent); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (discussing detention of presumptive U.S.
citizen and alleged Al Qaeda fighter after 9/11).

33.

Starting over eighty years after the end of the Civil War, Congress also
played a role in providing compensation to the victims of the JapaneseAmerican internment. The Supreme Court never formally adjudicated the
constitutional merits of the detention of Japanese-Americans pursuant to the
internment program. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Rather, the Court merely upheld the conviction of Fred Korematsu for
declining to obey the military evacuation order that applied to JapaneseAmericans on the West Coast. Id. at 224. Congress had made failure to
comply with such orders a federal offense. Almost forty years after the
Court’s Korematsu decision, a federal district court granted Korematsu’s
writ of coram nobis seeking to vacate his conviction on grounds that the
government’s evacuation order and legal defense of the order were riddled
with misrepresentations and material omissions. See Korematsu v. United
States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1419–20 (N.D. Cal. 1984); see also Hirabayashi v.
United States, 828 F.2d 591, 597–604 (9th Cir. 1987) (summarizing the
district court’s findings); Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 232–36, 246–
53 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (detailing facts of government deception at time of
internment
while
holding
that
concealment
of
government
misrepresentations warranted tolling of statute of limitations for claims for
damages); vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 482 U.S. 64 (1987). Around this
time, Congress, which had enacted a measure shortly after World War II,
provided modest compensation to internees as well as an acknowledgment of
official wrongdoing. See Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice
on Trial—Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the
War on Terror, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1269, 1321 (2003).

34.

It is true that over time courts adjudicating suits for damages against officials
began to distinguish between conduct based on delegated discretion and
unauthorized acts. See Kian, supra note 20, at 154. However, this distinction
never fully addressed the departure it entailed from prior doctrine and
practice. Id.
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Justice Kennedy’s concern in Abbasi with the novel nature of
certain suits for damages by foreign nationals should not obscure the
fact that Framers viewed openness to those lawsuits as a key rationale
for the Constitution’s enactment. While the Articles of Confederation
were in force, private violence was common against foreign nationals,
particularly British subjects.35 United States citizens who were
indignant about British ownership of property in the post-Revolution
republic often resorted to self-help, taking property when it suited them.
Under the international law of the period, the failure to redress such
wrongs constituted just cause for war waged by the country whose
citizens were deprived of remedies. In drafting the Constitution, the
Framers authorized Congress to “define and punish . . . Offences against
the Law of Nations.”36 Pursuant to the Define and Punish Clause,
Congress passed legislation, including the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”),
which gave a remedy to foreign nationals injured by torts committed in
violation of international law.37 In addition, in Article III of the
Constitution, the Framers expressly conferred on the federal courts
jurisdiction to hear claims involving “foreign . . . Citizens.”38 This
sustained attention was no accident.
In Federalist No. 80, Hamilton squarely linked the need for federal
courts with their role in upholding fairness for foreign nationals in the
United States.39 Hamilton acknowledged that the United States’ “denial
or perversion of justice” in a matter concerning a foreign national would
rank highly among the “just causes of war.”40 To avoid this risk to the
new republic, Hamilton championed Article III’s provision of a neutral,
independent tribunal for adjudication of such disputes.41 Notably,
Hamilton viewed the role of the federal courts as “essential to the

35.

See Bellia & Clark, supra note 19, at 1623–24.

36.

U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 10.

37.

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).

38.

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.

39.

See The Federalist No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).

40.

See id. Views articulated in the Federalist Papers are instructive, although
caution is appropriate in extrapolating from essays by Hamilton, Madison,
and Jay to the intentions of the Framers as a group. See David McGowan,
Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, and the
Supreme Court, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 755, 755–59 (2001).

41.

Federalist No. 78 famously articulates Hamilton’s vision of an independent
federal judiciary protected by life tenure under Article III. See The
Federalist No. 78, supra note 12, at 465 (describing an independent
judiciary as an “excellent barrier” to the risk of oppression by the political
branches).
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preservation of the public faith”42 in the rule of law, not merely as an
expedient to avoid foreign entanglements. As we shall see, Hamilton’s
view here suggests that federal courts adjudicating matters involving
foreign nationals would have the same salutary effect that such neutral
tribunals would have elsewhere on instilling sound habits of deliberation
in public officials.43
Legal defenses in tort asserted by foreign nationals also played a
vital role in the development of U.S. constitutionalism, including the
institution of judicial review. A vital case under the Articles of Confederation, Rutgers v. Waddington,44 pitted the brilliant young Alexander
Hamilton against the plain reading of a New York statute allowing U.S.
citizens to sue British citizens who had obtained title to U.S. nationals’
land during the Revolution. Often this change of title occurred as
British troops assumed control over land during the Revolution’s military campaigns. British forces then conveyed the land to British subjects to ensure the loyalty of property owners. The treaty with Britain
ending the conflict provided protection for British nationals who had
taken title based on military orders.
Hamilton argued that both the treaty and customary international
law provided the British owners with a defense against trespass actions
lodged by the former U.S. owners who had fled during the fighting.45
According to Hamilton, the New York court hearing the trespass action
had to construe the state statute in light of international law, providing
the British nationals with a defense despite the clear wording of the
New York statute.46

42.

The Federalist No. 80, supra note 39, at 476.

43.

See The Federalist No. 78, supra note 12, at 470–71 (Alexander
Hamilton) (arguing that prudent public officials who wished to avoid rebuffs
in the courts would “qualify their attempts” at overreaching; the
“moderation” yielded by this tempering “influence upon the character of our
governments” would enhance long-term thinking and thus aid
constitutionalism).

44.

Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. Mayor’s Ct. 1784), reprinted in 1 The Law
Practice of Alexander Hamilton: Documents and Commentary
393–419 (Julius Goebel, Jr. ed., 1964); see also Daniel M. Golove & Daniel
J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the
Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 932, 963–66 (2010) (analyzing Rutgers); Peter Margulies, Defining,
Punishing, and Membership in the Community of Nations: Material Support
and Conspiracy Charges in Military Commissions, 36 Fordham Int’l L.J.
1, 17–19 (2013) (same).

45.

Margulies, supra note 44, at 18.

46.

See id.
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Scholars have rightly recognized Rutgers as a landmark in the
development of U.S. theories of judicial review.47 Hamilton nodded to
its reasoning in Federalist No. 78, in which he argued that judicial discretion included the venerable craft of endeavoring that two provisions
in tension be “by any fair construction . . . reconciled to each other.”48
Where this was impossible, Hamilton explained, a court would have to
prioritize one provision over the other.49 In Rutgers, Hamilton persuaded the New York court to stretch construction of the New York
statute in order to avoid a clash with international law.50 This move set
the stage for Chief Justice Marshall’s articulation in Marbury v.
Madison of the rationale for judicial review.51 It also was a template for
Marshall’s formulation in the Charming Betsy case of the canon that
the courts should construe federal statutes to avoid conflict with international law.52 This vital conceptual work all flowed from Rutgers, a
suit involving a tort defense asserted by a foreign national. In sum,
suits and defenses by foreign nationals played a prominent role in building U.S. constitutionalism.53

47.

See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 44, at 963.

48.

The Federalist No. 78, supra note 12, at 468.

49.

Id.

50.

See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of
Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Geo. L.J.
479, 487 n.41 (1998).

51.

See id.

52.

Id. at 487.

53.

The passage of the Alien Act during the presidency of John Adams does not
undercut this early record of due regard for the rights and interests of foreign
nationals. The Alien Act gave the President authority to deport any foreign
national whom the President deemed to be “dangerous to the peace and
safety of the United States.” Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The
Age of Federalism 591 (1993). However, President John Adams did not
invoke the Alien Act, which expired in June of 1800. Id. at 591–92. Moreover,
political figures closely involved in the Constitution’s enactment, including
both Madison and Hamilton, were wary of the Act. Hamilton, himself an
immigrant from the West Indies, found the statute “deficient in precautions
against abuse.” From Alexander Hamilton to Theodore Sedgwick, 2 February
1799, Nat’l Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Hamilton/01-22-02-0267 [https://perma.cc/AQT8-KUBC] (last visited Feb.
22, 2018); see H. Jefferson Powell, The Principles of ‘98: A Essay in
Historical Retrieval, 80 Va. L. Rev. 689, 704 n.52 (1994). Madison, for his
part, viewed both statutes as a signal of the Federalists’ arrogance and
predilection for abuse of power. See, e.g., Elkins & McKitrick, supra, at
700–05. Those excesses helped usher in the victory of the Jeffersonian
Democratic Republicans in 1800, who campaigned in large part against the
effects of the Alien and Sedition Acts. See, e.g., id. at 696–701. If anything,
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The Supreme Court’s decision over 150 years later in Bivens did
not directly acknowledge the extended pedigree of suits for damages
against public officials. However, the decision continued the pro-remedy
default position that characterized this area during the Founding Era
and in subsequent years. In Bivens, the plaintiff sought damages for a
warrantless search for drugs at his home in which federal agents
allegedly used flagrantly excessive force on him in full view of his
family.54 According to Bivens, the search violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.55 The search
yielded no evidence of drugs, and authorities never charged Bivens with
a crime.56
Both Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, and Justice Harlan,
who authored an influential concurrence, cited the equitable discretion
that federal courts presumptively possess.57 Each Justice noted that
equitable discretion traditionally includes weighing the efficacy of proposed remedies. In Bivens’ case, those remedies were limited. An injunction would not be appropriate in the absence of evidence that federal
agents planned further warrantless searches of Bivens’ residence.
Moreover, the exclusionary rule was not applicable, since the government had not charged Bivens with a crime, let alone sought to admit
illegally seized evidence in such a prosecution. Given the absence of
other remedies for the alleged official misconduct against Bivens,
Justices Brennan and Harlan in their respective opinions agreed that
equitable discretion pointed to damages against the offending officials
as the most appropriate remedy.58
Although the Bivens Court’s invocation of equitable discretion was
a persuasive rationale, the omission by Justices Brennan and Harlan of
damage suits’ long pedigree made the reasoning of these opinions appear
evanescent. Each opinion addressed Congress’s role in ways that augured ill for expansion of Bivens. Justice Harlan’s concurrence cited
contemporary cases in which the Court had found that inferring the
availability of a private right of action for violation of a statute
the Alien Act’s toothless implementation and speedy demise demonstrate
the regard for foreign nationals during the Founding Era.
54.

See Pfander, supra note 5, at 20.

55.

Id. at 23.

56.

Id. at 20.

57.

Justice Brennan stated that “where legal rights have been invaded [and there
is a right to sue] . . . federal courts may use any available remedy to make
good the wrong done.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S 388, 396 (1971) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 684 (1946) (internal quotations omitted)). Justice Harlan echoed this
proposition in his concurrence. Id. at 400–02 (Harlan, J., concurring).

58.

Id. at 395–97 (majority opinion); id. at 406–10 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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effectuated legislative intent.59 That reference, as we shall see, weakened
the case for Bivens remedies when the Court turned against implied
rights of action, finding them an intrusion into Congress’s prerogatives.
In addition, Justice Brennan added an important caveat, observing that
permitting a suit for damages against public officials would not be appropriate in the presence of what Justice Brennan cryptically called
“special factors counselling hesitation” in creating such a remedy.60
Those “special factors,” Justice Brennan explained, should trigger judicial restraint in creating remedies absent some “affirmative” indication
from Congress that it believed such a remedy was necessary.61 Over
time, as we shall see, Supreme Court decisions culminating in Abbasi
cited these concerns as a basis for reversing the pro-remedy default position that had prevailed since the Framers’ day.
In the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected
efforts to make Bivens actions available in different contexts. For example, in Wilkie v. Robbins,62 the Court declined to find that Bivens extended to a property owner’s claim that federal officials had retaliated
against him because of a long-simmering land dispute.63 Similarly, in
Hartman v. Moore,64 the Court held that no claim for damages was
available to a person who alleged that federal officials retaliated against
him by initiating an unfounded criminal prosecution.65
In addition, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,66 which involved the post-9/11
immigration detentions also at issue in Abbasi, the Court held that the
plaintiffs had not plausibly pleaded their allegations that senior officials
intentionally targeted the plaintiffs for arrest because of their race,
religion, or national origin.67 As Justice Kennedy put it in his opinion
for the Court in Iqbal, this line of precedent has shown that the Court
is “reluctant to extend Bivens liability ‘to any new context or new
category of defendants.’”68 In other words, the Court has balked at recognizing an action for damages directly under the Constitution against
federal officials in any setting apart from those narrow contexts recognized by Bivens itself and its two immediate progeny: searches by
federal agents, prison conditions, and employment discrimination in
59.

Id. at 402 (Harlan, J., concurring).

60.

Id. at 396 (majority opinion).

61.

Id.

62.

551 U.S. 537 (2007).

63.

Id. at 541–43.

64.

547 U.S. 250 (2006).

65.

Id. at 262–66.

66.

556 U.S. 662 (2009).

67.

Id. at 669, 686–87.

68.

Id. at 675 (citation omitted).
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violation of the Equal Protection Clause. That reticence set the stage
for the Court’s decisive retreat from Bivens in Abbasi.

II. Abbasi and the Story of the Post-9/11 Immigration
Roundup
Abbasi was not the first Supreme Court case to address the arrest
and detention of immigrants after 9/11; as noted above, Iqbal came before. Indeed, the skepticism about Bivens in national security cases that
Justice Kennedy revealed in Iqbal was a harbinger of the glum reception
that the Bivens claims received from the Court in the latter case.
However, the facts of Abbasi also present a counter-narrative, which
could have impelled a different Court to recognize the Bivens action’s
value in national security litigation.69 Understanding that counter-narrative is essential to grasping the cost to constitutionalism of the road
not taken in Abbasi.
A. Immigration, Detention, and National Security

One obstacle to the counter-narrative in Abbasi was a fact not lost
on the Court: the deference the Court has often displayed to the political branches on immigration matters. Well over a century ago, the
Court held that Congress has plenary power over immigration.70 That
power is at its height on issues concerning criteria for the admission of
foreign nationals to the United States. National security justifications
have contributed to this deferential posture.
In the past, the Supreme Court has upheld the indefinite detention
of foreign nationals seeking to enter the United States.71 In one case
during the Cold War, the detainee was a lawful permanent resident,
but not a citizen, who departed from the United States; officials cited
national security reasons for barring his subsequent reentry. In that
case, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,72 the government relied on secret evidence that it refused to disclose to the courts.73 The

69.

Shirin Sinnar has provided the most compelling account of that counternarrative, framed by an insightful analysis of the Iqbal decision. See generally
Sinnar, supra note 5.

70.

See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600–03, 609 (1889).

71.

This paragraph and the following two borrow from earlier work. See
Geoffrey Corn, Jimmy Gurulé, Eric Talbot Jensen & Peter
Margulies, National Security Law: Principles and Policy 296
(2015).

72.

345 U.S. 206 (1953).

73.

Id. at 217 (Black, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court nonetheless upheld the detention, viewing the executive
branch as exercising power duly delegated to it by Congress.74
While the government claimed that its post-9/11 immigration
detentions focused on possible terrorist links, the Justice Department’s
own Inspector General subsequently found that government personnel
participating in this effort detected virtually no evidence of terrorist
ties among the detainees.75 Instead, the investigation from the start centered on routine immigration violations committed by Muslim immigrants from the Middle East and South Asia. The FBI received 96,000
tips about individuals who in some fashion prompted suspicion.76 Many
tips stemmed from gossipy neighbors, landlords looking for the latest
rent check, and old employers with a grudge.77
Many other tips in the FBI’s sprawling post-9/11 investigation
flowed from more generic fears, as a jumpy populace chafed about the
mere presence of Middle Eastern or South Asian persons. For example,
one tipster warned investigators that a grocery store was “operated by
numerous Middle Eastern men.”78 Government investigators raided the
store, checked employees’ immigration status, and arrested those without valid immigration documents.79 In another case, facts underlying an
initial arrest suggested a possible terrorist link, but subsequent evidence
disproved that theory.80 In that case, New York City police officers cited
the Middle Eastern driver of a car for a traffic violation. In searching
the vehicle, which also contained two passengers from the Middle East,
the police found plans for a public school. Police contacted the men’s
employer, who informed the authorities that the men needed the plans
because they were doing construction work on school grounds.81 Despite

74.

Id. at 214–16.

75.

See Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The September 11
Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration
Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks
41–42 (2003) [hereinafter September 11 Detainees], https://oig.justice.gov/
special/0306/full.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3JW-5DPK] (concluding that
arrests generally occurred because of “chance encounters or tenuous
connections” rather than “genuine indications” of terrorist ties).

76.

Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 225–27 (2d Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom.
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).

77.

Peter Margulies, Law’s Detour: Politics, Ideology, and Justice
in the Bush Administration 28 (2010).

78.

Id. at 28–29.

79.

Id.

80.

Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 231.

81.

Id.
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this clear evidence that was counter to the terrorism theory, federal officials arrested and detained the individuals in question.82
Far from being foreign agents, a large majority of the detainees
were ordinary undocumented immigrants who had lived in the New
York metropolitan area for years. Like most undocumented immigrants,
the detainees had participated in the underground economy and scrambled to find unskilled work.83 Prior to 9/11, the detainees had melded
into the metropolitan landscape, living from paycheck to paycheck like
many U.S. citizens and lawful residents. In some cases, like some U.S.
citizens and lawful residents struggling to make ends meet, the detainees had engaged in low-level criminal conduct such as identity theft, albeit conduct with no link to terrorism.84
In the weeks following the 9/11 attacks, the government used such
sweeps to arrest and detain in federal correctional facilities more than
700 undocumented immigrants from a range of countries in the Middle
East and South Asia.85 Many of the detainees could not contact lawyers.
Moreover, federal correction officers and other nonimmigrant inmates
subjected a substantial number of the detainees to egregious physical
abuse.86 When detainees sought release from detention as they awaited
their removal from the United States, government lawyers told immigration judges in the Justice Department’s Executive Office for
Immigration Review that the detentions were part of an investigation
into the 9/11 attacks. However, the government never presented specific, concrete evidence of terrorist links, apparently because such links
did not exist.87
Plaintiffs—in allegations that courts found to be plausible—
asserted that senior officials knowingly or intentionally made decisions
that led to the ill treatment and excessive detention experienced by
some of the detainees.88 The plaintiffs’ pleadings did not allege that senior officials ordered the ill treatment.89 However, senior officials allegedly merged a “New York List” of detainees with a broader nationwide list compiled by what was then the Justice Department’s

82.

Id.

83.

See Sinnar, supra note 5, at 394–95.

84.

Id. at 395–96.

85.

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1852 (2017).

86.

Id. at 1853.

87.

Id.

88.

Id. at 1853–54.

89.

Id. at 1854.
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Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”).90 The INS List included persons whom the FBI had, typically without any evidence,
designated as “of interest” to the 9/11 investigation.91 Senior officials
had earlier decided to “exert maximum pressure” on this group by restricting their contacts, delaying final immigration hearings, and informing law enforcement authorities that the detainees were suspected
terrorists, even though no evidence revealed terrorist ties.92 The effect
of that merger was the subjection of many New York detainees to harsh
conditions such as segregation in maximum-security federal correctional
units and subjection to physical abuse, even when “no . . . suspicion
existed” that the detainees had links to terrorism.93 Moreover, abundant
publicity should have made reasonable officials aware of these horrendous conditions early on in the detention process.94
B. Retrenching on Remedies: The Court’s Decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi

In Abbasi, the Court held that a Bivens action was not available to
the post-9/11 plaintiffs. The majority’s rationale95 definitively reversed
the pro-remedy presumption that had governed actions for damages
against public officials since before the Founding Era. To accomplish
this, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, invoked the proviso in
Justice Brennan’s opinion in Bivens. According to Justice Kennedy,
“special factors counselling hesitation” precluded a Bivens action in
Abbasi and would likely have the same effect in most “new” contexts
beyond the hoary troika of domestic searches, prison conditions, and
employment discrimination that the Court had set out decades earlier.96
In new contexts, Justice Kennedy contended, a Bivens action was likely
to chill officials’ legitimate discretion and interfere with Congress’s

90.

See generally Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F. 3d 218, 227–28 (2d Cir. 2015).
Subsequently, Congress reorganized immigration agencies, and INS became
the division of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) within the
new federal Department of Homeland Security.

91.

Id. at 231.

92.

Id.

93.

Id. at 232.

94.

Margulies, supra note 3, at 222. Because this publicity was so extensive, a
reasonable factfinder could readily have inferred that senior officials knew of
these abuses.

95.

Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas. Justice Breyer filed a dissent, which
Justice Ginsburg joined. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch took no
part in the case. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).

96.

See id. at 1857–58.
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ability to balance deterrence, compensation, and the risk of hampering
officials’ discharge of their duties.97
To justify reversing the pro-remedy presumption that Bivens continued, Justice Kennedy cited the Court’s post-Bivens pivot from finding of implied rights of action under statutes.98 Justice Kennedy asserted
that the separation of powers concerns that had driven the Court’s
reticence in inferring private rights of action under statutes should
prompt similar caution regarding causes of action for constitutional
rights.99 According to Justice Kennedy, just as finding an implied
statutory right of action might skew a carefully calibrated statutory
scheme, finding a right of action directly under the Constitution might
upset a framework that met Congress’s needs.100 Courts should therefore
be cautious, absent the “affirmative” indication from Congress that the
Bivens majority had stated would be necessary when “special factors
counselling hesitation” suggested the importance of judicial restraint.101
On this view, courts intrude on Congress’s prerogatives if they
recognize a right of action that can affect relationships between state
and federal governments or among private sector entities. The unintended consequences wrought by litigation are a fit subject for Congress
to weigh in the balance against the importance of deterring wrongdoing
and compensating victims. Requiring Congress to expressly recognize a
private right of action for damages ensures that Congress will engage
in this balancing task, for which it is more suited than the courts.
Moreover, Justice Kennedy noted in Abbasi, the potential for litigation
can distract senior officials from their duties. In addition, the adverse
consequences of suits for damages may be unnecessary to prevent abuse,
since other remedies such as habeas corpus are available to victims.102
Elaborating on this theme, Justice Kennedy outlined a number of
factors that should guide courts in deciding when to recognize Bivens
actions. First, Justice Kennedy cited the newness test, noting that
courts should decline to imply a right of action under the Constitution
when the case is “different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens
97.

See id. at 1860–63.

98.

Id. at 1855.

99.

Id. at 1856.

100. Id. at 1858.
101. See id.; see also Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1402–03 (2018)
(invoking reluctance to infer that Congress authorized suits for damages in
holding that foreign corporations were not cognizable defendants under Alien
Tort Statute); Ernest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort
Statute, and Transnational Public-Law Adjudication After Kiobel, 64 Duke
L.J. 1023, 1069–72 (2015) (discussing parallels between the Court’s evolving
view of implied statutory and constitutional rights of action).
102. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862–1863.
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cases decided by this Court.”103 Expanding on this amorphous caveat,
Justice Kennedy noted certain differences that would be “meaningful
enough” to frame the action as “new” under the Court’s definition.104
For example, a court could consider the:
[R]ank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue;
the generality or specificity of the official action, the extent of
judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond to the
problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other
legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of
disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other
branches; or the presence of potential special factors that previous
Bivens cases did not consider.105

With these criteria as a general guide, Justice Kennedy dug deeper
in the details of the post-9/11 detention. Justice Kennedy’s rationale
relied heavily on the same tacit view of government probity that he had
exhibited earlier in Iqbal—the Court’s earlier decision holding that the
post-9/11 immigration detainees’ complaints of discrimination were not
plausible.106 In Iqbal, Justice Kennedy described the decisions authorizing the arrest and detention of immigrants after 9/11 as a “legitimate
policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks.”107 As we have seen, Justice
Kennedy’s anodyne description contrasted sharply with the random
103. Id. at 1859. In January, 2018, the Court also refined its test for determining
when government officials enjoyed qualified immunity from suit. See District
of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018) (clarifying that, even
when a cause of action is available to sue officials for damages, officials lose
qualified immunity only when legal rule barring their conduct is not merely
“suggested by then-existing precedent” but is “clear enough that every
reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the
plaintiff seeks to apply”) (emphasis added); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 138
S. Ct. 1148, 1152–54 (2018) (per curiam) (in determining whether law is
“clearly established” for purpose of abrogating official’s qualified immunity
from suit, reading “clearly established” test narrowly to preserve qualified
immunity when police officer shot individual carrying a knife who officer
believed posed a threat to another). While the subject of qualified immunity
is beyond the scope of this Article, the Court’s high threshold for “settled
law” that vitiates qualified immunity parallels the analysis in Abbasi of the
precedent required to establish the availability of a Bivens remedy in a
particular factual context.
104. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859–60.
105. Id. at 1860.
106. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681–83 (2009) (holding that allegations of
discriminatory intent in initial investigation of detainees were implausible
and that senior officials did not have supervisory liability for abuses).
107. Id. at 682.
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roundup that the Justice Department’s own Inspector General described.108
Justice Kennedy’s evaluation in Abbasi of the risks and benefits
posed by the availability of Bivens was a study in asymmetry. In
marked distinction to the premises that usually prevail under judicial
review of detention, Justice Kennedy viewed the risk of unlawful official
conduct as remote.109 In contrast, Justice Kennedy viewed the risk of
hindering “legitimate” national security efforts as immediate.110
According to Justice Kennedy, the decision to detain certain noncitizens
for substantial periods under harsh conditions despite the absence of
evidence linking detainees to terrorism was not heedless or vindictive;
rather, it was a “high-level executive policy created in the wake of a
major terrorist attack on American soil.”111 Justice Kennedy asserted
that officials need to “discharge . . . their duties”112 in the face of such
crises. Those duties include deliberation about possible responses to the
threat of future attacks.
According to Justice Kennedy, pursuit of a damages claim against
the senior officials responsible for the policy could impede official decisions that must of necessity compress deliberation into a tight temporal window.113 As Justice Kennedy observed, litigation would entail
“inquiry and discovery into the whole course of the discussions and
deliberations” that drove those official actions.114 Justice Kennedy asserted that such judicial proceedings would “interfere in an intrusive
way with sensitive functions of the Executive Branch.”115 The prospect
of litigation could cause officials to “second-guess difficult but necessary
decisions,”116 stifling capabilities that the executive branch needs to
respond to an evolving spectrum of threats.117
108. Cf. Sinnar, supra note 5, at 428–30 (noting the tenor and substance in the
Iqbal majority opinion and cautioning about its insidious long-term effects).
109. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1863.
110. Id. at 1861.
111. Id. at 1860.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1860–61.
115. Id. at 1861.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1862 (cautioning against judicial crafting of remedy such as suit for
damages absent “affirmative action by Congress”) (citing Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396
(1971)). Shortly after deciding Abbasi, the Supreme Court remanded a case
involving a border shooting with instructions to the court below to consider
the case in light of Abbasi’s approach. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct.

1170

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018
The Need for Bivens Suits in National Security Cases

Moreover, Justice Kennedy portrayed the trade-off between compensating victims and hindering future national security efforts as a
zero-sum game. For Justice Kennedy, even the prospect of a detainee
lawsuit for damages litigated to a disposition on the merits would adversely affect future officials’ vigilance against national security threats.
Justice Kennedy never acknowledged that a space might exist in which
future officials would steer clear of egregious abuses while still remaining devoted to the protection of the U.S. public. Justice Kennedy’s vision of a stark choice between overreaction and utter abdication would
have puzzled the Framers, who favored moderation in official decisions.

III. Critiquing Abbasi’s Anti-Remedy Presumption
On several fronts, the reasoning in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for
the Court in Abbasi should elicit countervailing arguments. The opinion’s equation of statutory and constitutional causes of action is flawed.
In addition, the opinion’s view of damages as an extraordinary remedy
and injunctions or habeas corpus as the norm conflicts with traditional
assumptions. More broadly, the opinion’s reliance on the perceived novelty of a lawsuit as the boundary between accepted and disfavored uses
of Bivens liability introduces a subjective and arbitrary element into
judicial review. Similarly, the opinion’s zero-sum account of the tradeoff between deterrence of constitutional violations and vigilance against
terrorist threats unduly shrinks the space available to honor both
virtues.
2003, 2006–07 (2017) (per curiam). In Hernandez, an agent of the U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”), which along with ICE is now part of
the Department of Homeland Security, stood on U.S. territory and from that
position shot and killed an unarmed Mexican teenage boy on Mexican
territory. The culvert where the CBP agent, the boy, and the boy’s friends
were located was an area straddling the U.S.-Mexican border that by custom,
practice, and formal agreement, had been maintained by the United States
for years. Id. at 2009–10 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The boy’s family sued the
CBP agent for damages, claiming that the shooting violated the boy’s rights
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Fifth Circuit had resolved
the case by holding that the boy, as a Mexican national on Mexican territory,
had no Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 2007. The Supreme Court declined
to resolve this issue, citing its sensitivity and “far reaching” consequences.
Instead, the Court directed the Fifth Circuit to first consider whether Abbasi
barred assertion of a claim for damages, whatever the merits of the
underlying substantive issue. Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that the
Court should have held that the Fourth Amendment applied, given the close
cooperation between the United States and Mexico on maintenance of the
culvert in which the shooting occurred. Id. at 2009–10. Justice Breyer would
have remanded solely on the Abbasi question. Id. at 2011. On remand, the
Fifth Circuit held that the lawsuit presented a “new context” and therefore
was an inappropriate vessel for a Bivens claim. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 885
F.3d 811, 816–18 (5th Cir. 2018).
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A. The Difference Between Constitutional and Statutory Claims

Justice Kennedy’s analogy between constitutional and statutory
causes of action is flawed. First, constitutional causes of action have a
much sturdier pedigree, dating back to English courts’ invocation of
unwritten “ancient rights” prior to the American Revolution and the
enactment of the U.S. Constitution. Those actions informed the U.S.
colonists’ fight for independence and the Framers’ understanding of fundamental legal rights. In the Founding Era and after, courts upheld
damage suits against officials for comparable reasons.118
Rights guaranteed by the Constitution require a fuller suite of
protections than those afforded statutory duties. The latter Congress
can confer or take away, as it chooses. However, the former are part of
the fundamental charter of governance itself. As Hamilton noted in his
denunciation of pre-Constitution efforts to confiscate the property of
colonists who had remained loyal to Britain during the Revolutionary
War, “the constitution is the compact made between the society at
large and the individual. The society therefore cannot, without breach
of faith and injustice, refuse to any individual, a single advantage which
he derives under that compact.”119 To do so is a recipe for “arbitrary”
government, not the rule of law.120 Without a robust capacity to deter
this overreaching, officials can quickly assume the role of “perpetual
118. Justice Story was particularly clear on this point. See The Apollon, 22 U.S.
362, 366–67 (1824). Justice Story explained that:
It may be fit and proper for the government, in the exercise of the
high discretion confided to the executive, for great public purposes,
to act on a sudden emergency, or to prevent an irreparable mischief,
by summary measures, which are not found in the text of the laws.
Such measures are properly matters of state, and if the [executive]
responsibility is taken, under justifiable circumstances, the
Legislature will doubtless apply a proper indemnity. But this Court
can only look to the questions, whether the laws have been violated;
and if they were, justice demands that the injured party should
receive a suitable redress.
Id; see also Pfander, supra note 5, at 165 (discussing ramifications of
Story’s view for post-9/11 abuses).
119. Second Letter from Phocion to the Considerate Citizens of New York,
reprinted in Works of Alexander Hamilton; Comprising His
Correspondence, and His Political and Official Writings,
Exclusive of the Federalist, Civil and Military 301, 322 (C. John
ed., 1851) [hereinafter Second Letter from Phocion]; see also Daniel J.
Hulsebosch, A Discrete and Cosmopolitan Minority: The Loyalists, the
Atlantic World, and the Origins of Judicial Review, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
825, 841 (2006) (discussing Hamilton’s vigorous advocacy against measures
targeting loyalists).
120. See Second Letter from Phocion, supra note 119, at 322.
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dictators.”121 The failure of deterrence thus strains the separation of
powers and other structural provisions that enable the legislature to
function. The stakes for constitutional governance require a cause of action to fully remedy constitutional torts.
Hamilton’s warning about the risks of post-Revolution confiscatory
policies toward loyalists dovetails with the stain of the Japanese-American internment and the needlessly harsh post-9/11 roundup of Muslims.
Hamilton criticized the “passion . . . prejudice . . . [and] resentment”
that drove state measures in New York and elsewhere to strip loyalists
of their property.122 Those negative emotions at the state level drove
federal actions against Japanese-Americans in the aftermath of Pearl
Harbor.123
In certain respects, the impetus and nature of the post-9/11 roundup was different. Virtually all of the detainees lacked a lawful immigration status, which meant that officials could lawfully arrest and remove them, with detention authorized when necessary to prevent acts
of violence and ensure their appearance for subsequent proceedings.124
Moreover, public pronouncements by senior officials after the 9/11 attacks lacked the pervasive bigotry that characterized discourse about
the need for internment during World War II. On the other hand, senior
officials’ willingness to order harsh detention of a particular group of
immigrants with distinctive markers for religion, ethnicity, and national
origin echoed the abuses of earlier eras. The determination to “exert
maximum pressure”125 on this particular group absent any evidence of
terrorist ties suggests that senior officials viewed the need for fairness
and individualized criteria as what Hamilton sardonically called “partial
inconveniences.”126 When rule-of-law principles become inconvenient,
Hamilton warned, “the constitution is slighted or explained away.”127
Maintaining constitutionalism is hard work; officials cannot slacken
their efforts to promote constitutionalist values because the rule of law
seems to be a nuisance. Diverging from the deference to official discretion exhibited in Abbasi, Hamilton appeared to suggest that preserving
constitutionalism required robust remedies.

121. Id.
122. See id. at 328.
123. See generally Irons, supra note 1, at 7; Yamamoto et al., supra note 33,
at 1274–75 (citation omitted).
124. Margulies, supra note 77, at 27–28.
125. Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F. 3d 218, 227–28 (2d Cir. 2015).
126. Second Letter from Phocion, supra note 119, at 322.
127. Id. at 328.
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B. Misplacing Damages in the Hierarchy of Remedies

Citing available alternatives to a suit for damages also misconceives
the rationale for such suits and their venerable place in the hierarchy
of relief for official wrongs. At common law, suits for damages were the
default, and injunctions were an “extraordinary remedy.”128 Under longstanding principles guiding equitable discretion, a court would not issue
an injunction unless a suit for damages was an inadequate remedy. By
making issuance of an injunction contingent on there being no “adequate remedy at law,”129 courts limited the availability of injunctive
relief. Determination of whether an award of damages was an “adequate” remedy would hinge on whether a party would suffer “irreparable harm” from ongoing violations of law while litigating the award
of damages.130 One reason for this doctrinal distinction is the potential
for overreaching in injunctions, which mandate certain conduct as a
means of compliance with the injunction’s terms.131 In contrast, a suit
for damages leaves the defendant a choice—engage in wrongful conduct
and pay damages to wronged persons, or refrain from that conduct.
That choice, according to the common law, is less intrusive than injunctive mandates.132 On this view, an award of damages is more in
keeping with individual liberty in private law disputes and more consistent with appropriate deference for government in public law. Given
this traditional view of injunctions as a more intrusive remedy than
damages, it is ironic that Justice Kennedy in Abbasi highlighted the potential for disruption wrought by suits for damages. That perspective
turns traditional equitable doctrine on its head.133
128. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941); see also
Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 Vand. L. Rev.
997, 1028–29 (2015) (analyzing case law).
129. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); Bray, supra
note 128, at 1004. But see Douglas Laycock, The Death of the
Irreparable Injury Rule 3–36 (1991) (arguing that finding of irreparable
injury is often irrelevant in practice when courts determine whether or not
to grant a permanent injunction).
130. Bray, supra note 128, at 1005.
131. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 33 (2008) (holding that the
court failed to exercise appropriate discretion when it enjoined naval training
exercise because U.S. Navy had failed to complete environmental impact
statement). But see Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of
Statutes, 96 Va. L. Rev. 485, 486 (2010) (critiquing Winter as exhibiting
undue deference to government).
132. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 30–31 (noting that a “more intrusive restriction” in
the form of an injunction on a naval training exercise may threaten the
navy’s preparedness for war).
133. Justice Kennedy made this inversion of traditional approaches express by
noting that concerns about judicial intrusion on executive decision-making
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Moreover, Justice Kennedy was unduly optimistic in surmising that
the post-9/11 immigration detainees could have availed themselves of
any alternative remedies. Justice Kennedy suggested that the detainees
might have been able to seek “injunctive relief” or challenge conditions
of confinement by filing petitions for habeas corpus.134 However, Justice
Kennedy did not acknowledge that the lack of access to lawyers while
the Abbasi plaintiffs were in high-security detention effectively precluded access to these remedies.135 Under the circumstances, a suit for
damages was the only legal remedy available to deter future abuses or
compensate those wronged.
C. Misconstruing Congressional Silence

The Abbasi Court’s upending of the traditional pro-remedy presumption is even more salient in its discussion of Congress’s post-9/11
posture regarding remedies for official misconduct. Justice Kennedy asserted that Congress was aware of the risk of harsh detention conditions
and chose to authorize only limited measures to address the problem,
such as requiring reports by the Justice Department’s Office of the
Inspector General (“OIG”).136 According to Justice Kennedy, Congress’s
minimalist approach to remedies constituted evidence that legislators’
failure to expressly authorize suits for damages was more than a “mere
oversight” or product of inadvertence.137 However, Justice Kennedy
failed to acknowledge that the meaning of congressional silence is frequently subject to multiple interpretations.138
At least one plausible interpretation of legislative silence supports
the availability of Bivens remedies. The litigation on the detainees’ behalf was the subject of multiple decisions in district and appellate courts
prior to the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision limiting remedies in Iqbal.
At any time prior to the Court’s issuance of its decision in Abbasi,
Congress could have acted to preclude Bivens remedies for detainees.
Congress never did so. Congress’s inaction may, without more, constitute slender evidence that legislators favored monetary relief for detainees. Nevertheless, that inference is at least as plausible as Justice
are “even more pronounced when the judicial inquiry comes in the context
of a claim seeking money damages rather than a claim seeking injunctive or
other equitable relief . . . [t]he risk of personal damages liability is more likely
to cause an official to second-guess difficult but necessary decisions
concerning national-security policy.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861
(2017) (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 1862–63.
135. See Corn et al., supra note 71, at 296.
136. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862.
137. Id.
138. See Ethan J. Leib & James J. Brudney, Legislative Underwrites, 103 Va. L.
Rev. 1487, 1545 (2017).
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Kennedy’s construction of silence as connoting legislative disfavor.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion failed to explain why his construction was
superior. That omission is particularly glaring in light of the traditional
pro-remedies presumption that dates back to Founding Era national
security cases, such as Little v. Barreme and Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy.
D. The Novelty Test and Moral Hazard Versus Sound Judgment on
National Security Issues

In addition, Justice Kennedy’s focus on novelty as the touchstone
for denying access to Bivens increases moral hazard for officials. Moral
hazard is a pervasive risk of insurance: individuals who know they will
be shielded from the consequences of wrongdoing have an incentive to
fall short of what law or practice requires.139 Insurance can take many
forms. It can provide financial assistance, as in insurance policies or the
public indemnification that protects most if not all federal officials from
paying out of pocket for lawsuits against them.140 In addition, “insurance”—defined broadly—can include legal doctrines that hinder
litigation against officials in the first place. These doctrines include the
limits on Bivens suits that the Court articulated in Abbasi. Indeed, the
combination of Abbasi and indemnification doubles down on moral
hazard.
Moral hazard discourages officials from heeding the lessons of the
past. Precedents like Abbasi signal to officials that a proactive approach
to legal requirements is unnecessary, since only a limited range of conduct will trigger even the possibility of recovery by plaintiffs alleging
official wrongs. That double dose of legal protection encourages the
“spirit of injustice” that Hamilton cautioned against in Federalist No.
78:141 a toxic elixir that victimized Japanese-Americans during World
War II and the post-9/11 immigration detainees.
139. Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow first explained the concept of moral
hazard. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 941, 961 (1963) (explaining that in health
care, the availability of reimbursement care diminishes a consumer’s
incentive to seek the most cost-effective provider); Tom Baker, On the
Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 237, 270 (1996) (noting that
individuals with insurance will often take less care); Steven Shavell, On
Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. Econ. 541, 541–42 (1979) (discussing
moral hazard and insurance); cf. Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate
Crime, Advancement of Executives’ Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts,
7 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 55, 79–80 (2006) (discussing moral hazard in
corporate compensation to managers on reimbursement of defense costs).
140. See Cornelia L.T. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of
Public Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 Geo. L.J. 65, 76–77
(1999).
141. The Federalist No. 78, supra note 12, at 470.
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Abbasi and Iqbal portray the exercise of legal reasoning in national
security law as an arena fraught with peril, instead of a venue for sound
judgments that balance vigilance against threats and the maintenance
of constitutional values. To illustrate how the Court’s view clashes with
our best view of official decision-making, consider the example of a highly fraught decision in the foreign policy realm: the U.S. approach to the
Cuban Missile Crisis.142
Robert F. Kennedy, who served as the Attorney General and in
that capacity was a principal advisor to his brother, President John F.
Kennedy, was acutely conscious of the law. Robert Kennedy counseled
against a military strike on Cuba in part because he rightly saw such
action as a violation of international law limiting the use of force and
as a discordant echo of the attack over twenty years earlier by Japan
on American forces at Pearl Harbor.143 Citing that analogy as a cautionary tale, Kennedy and lawyers in the Administration recommended a
targeted naval blockade against Soviet missile shipments to Cuba rather than an all-out attack.144
That approach diffused the crisis, although its international law
bona fides were not entirely settled—then or now. Attorney General
Kennedy’s appreciation of legal constraints did not have a chilling
effect. Quite the opposite: it informed President Kennedy’s thinking,145
generating an ingenious approach that resolved the situation.
Law as analogy frequently plays this constructive role. That should
not be surprising, since any system of law—especially a common law
system—relies on courts and other players to decide what is reasonable
in new situations. Looking to that system for guidance is a straightforward move that will typically refine official decisions, instead of stifling decisions at their inception, as Justice Kennedy seemed to fear in
Abbasi.
The Framers understood this well. The Federalist Papers feature
scores of analogies to history or past practice. These analogies were
142. See Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention,
53 Hous. L. Rev. 971, 985 (2016); Bob Bauer, The National Security
Lawyer, in Crisis: When the “Best View” of the Law May Not Be the Best
View 6–30, (NYU Pub. L. & Leg. Theory Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 17-08, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2931165 [https://perma.cc/5RZZ-5934]; Peter Margulies, When to Push
the Envelope: Legal Ethics, the Rule of Law, and National Security Strategy,
30 Fordham Int’l L.J. 642, 669–72 (2007).
143. Margulies, supra note 142, at 669–70.
144. Id. at 670.
145. Id. at 669; cf. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States:
International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev.
1791, 1826–28, 1835 (2009) (discussing institutionalist vision of international
and constitutional law as coordinated games).
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considered prime sources of wisdom by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay.146
Often, those prescriptions may require tailoring to present conditions.
However, that look to the past and the tailoring of past prescriptions
to present uses is a crucial form of discipline. That discipline, in turn,
ensures that, in Jay’s words, decisions will be “temperate and cool,” not
precipitous.147
Hamilton’s letters as Phocion critiquing the persecution of loyalists
after the American Revolution148 provide a distinctive counterpoint to
Justice Kennedy’s assertion that the perceived novelty of legal issues
weakens the case for robust remedies against errant officials. Hamilton
was admittedly often a champion of deference to the Executive on national security and foreign affairs.149 Nevertheless, Hamilton also wrote
eloquently about the need to apply venerable principles to new challenges. In meeting these challenges, Hamilton extolled the avoidance of
arbitrariness and “discrimination.”150 Hamilton counseled skepticism
about claims that “revolution,” including implicitly the American Revolution, had made those principles less useful.151 While the novelty of
certain questions might require tweaking principles in some respects,
that adaptive process made the search for useful analogies from the past
even more urgent.
A diligent search for analogies would surely have informed the decisions of senior officials regarding the post-9/11 immigration detentions, just as it would have informed deliberations about the JapaneseAmerican internment decades earlier. Consider the broad proposition
that detention of an individual should require some individualized evidence that the individual poses a threat. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in

146. See generally McGowan, supra note 40 (discussing the method and
perspective of The Federalist’s authors).
147. See The Federalist No. 3, at 45 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Ironically, in an earlier opinion, Justice Kennedy cited Jay’s concern that
border states’ propensity for “sudden irritation” would skew U.S. foreign
policy unless a strong federal authority tempered that tendency. See Arizona
v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012) (citing a later edition of The
Federalist No. 3, at 39 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)).
148. See Second Letter from Phocion, supra note 119, at 288.
149. Typifying this concern, in Federalist No. 23, Hamilton warned, “it is
impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national
exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may
be necessary to satisfy them.” The Federalist No. 23, at 153 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis in original).
150. Second Letter from Phocion, supra note 119, at 321.
151. Id.
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Abbasi acknowledges this principle’s force.152 However, the Justice Department OIG Report concluded that evidence played little or no role
in decisions about post-9/11 detention—including the classification of
detainees as part of the “INS List” that triggered harsh conditions and
restrictions on contact with the outside world.153 There simply was no
evidence of terrorist ties for the overwhelming majority of detainees.154
It is reasonable to assume that senior officials either knew that, or could
readily have inferred it, since they surely would have received such evidence if it were available.
Perhaps, as some evidence in the record reflects, senior officials
believed that detaining individuals in maximum security settings would
dial up the “pressure” on detainees and shake loose information that
detainees had previously withheld. However, that strategy casts a
different, less flattering light on Justice Kennedy’s assertion that liability for damages would exert a chilling effect on official decision making. No U.S. official—senior, intermediate, or line-level—can order or
knowingly enable physical brutality against those in custody.155 Curbing
such conduct would not engender adverse consequences to national
security.
In sum, there was very little that was truly “new” about the legal
questions surrounding the post-9/11 immigration detentions. Every
plausible explanation for senior officials’ decisions regarding the post9/11 detainees described conduct that the law deters in other contexts.156 Deterring such wanton behavior would be a feature, not a
“bug,” of suits for damages.

152. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1861–62 (noting the importance of courts
“when individual liberties are at stake”) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 527, 532–37 (2004)).
153. See September 11 Detainees, supra note 75, at 41–42.
154. Id.
155. Ordering or knowingly enabling such abuse would be well above the
threshold for finding unconstitutional conduct. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at
1864–65 (citing principle of “deliberate indifference” of prisoners’ medical
needs in course of justifying remand to the Second Circuit for review of a
claim against a warden of a federal correctional facility where abuse of
detainees occurred, while suggesting that the standard for adjudicating the
claim that a warden “allowed guards to abuse pre-trial detainees” is “less
clear” and reiterating that post-9/11 context was “new” and thus would have
required at least a “modest extension” of precedent).
156. At the conclusion of discovery or trial, the plaintiffs in Abbasi may not have
been able to show that senior officials ordered or knowingly enabled abuse
of detainees. However, the effect of the Court’s decision was to deny the
plaintiffs the opportunity to try to make this showing regarding senior
officials.
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Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Abbasi cements a trend that had
been evident for some time: the narrowing of Bivens. Justifying Abbasi’s
definitive shift away from permitting suits for damages implied directly
from the Constitution, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court cited
two interrelated factors: 1) the risk of chilling official decisions on
important national security cases, and 2) the need to permit Congress
to balance that risk against the importance of compensating victims
and deterring future official misconduct. Unfortunately, history and
constitutional values provide little support for Abbasi’s outcome.
Since the Articles of Confederation era, the American law of official
liability rested on a pro-remedies presumption. Under this presumption,
courts could assess blame, and an official could seek ex-post indemnification from Congress. On rare occasions, Congress would prospectively grant immunity to certain kinds of officials. That said, having a
remedy available entailing monetary relief was the default position
adopted by courts, including prominent decisions such as Little v.
Barreme and Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy. That
accountability was viewed as central for the protection of rights in a
constitutional republic. Moreover, the views of the Framers coalesced
with this view. Hamilton, in particular, understood that judicial review
was a vital safeguard. Like his colleagues in drafting and advocating for
the Constitution, Hamilton also understood that the ability of foreign
nationals to secure monetary remedies in U.S. courts was a crucial asset
in the new republic’s quest for stability.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens built on this pro-remedy
presumption. Both Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, and Justice
Harlan, in his concurring opinion, stressed the presumption that Congress had delegated equitable discretion to the courts to select among
remedies and choose to make a damages remedy available when that
was necessary to promote compliance with constitutional values.
Upending this presumption, Abbasi fails to support the change it
marked from history and the Framers’ understandings. Justice
Kennedy’s concerns about chilling executive decisions and supplanting
Congress’s role ring hollow in light of longtime practice with the
availability of damages against errant government officials. In particular, Justice Kennedy’s assertion that damages could be more intrusive
to officials than injunctive relief ran counter to over two centuries of
doctrine and practice. The distinction that Justice Kennedy drew between “new” and traditional uses of Bivens allowed officials a convenient “out” from accountability. The Abbasi Court’s wariness about
remedies gives officials no incentive to avoid future abuses that echo
the post-9/11 immigration detentions.
Perhaps a culture of fidelity to law will guard against future grim
episodes like the Japanese-American internment. However, those who
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wished that remedies would encourage learning Korematsu’s lessons can
rightly fear that Abbasi will permit future officials to cut corners.
Abbasi’s abridgment of remedies seems like a prescription for continued
close encounters with official overreaching whenever the symptoms of
crisis appear.
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